Posts Tagged ‘SAMATE’

The Ockham Sound Analysis Criteria

September 16th, 2015 No comments

Yesterday a headline on a tool vendor blog caught my eye “… meets NIST high assurance standards”. What is this high assurance standard that I had not heard about before?

It turns out to be the Ockham Sound Analysis Criteria (which is not a standard, but is sort of connected to assurance at some level). I have been following the NIST group (now known as SAMATE) behind this work since their first meeting (the only one I have attended); their Static Analysis Tool Exposition (SATE) work is a great idea, but I imagine it has been an uphill battle convincing tool vendors to publicly expose the strength and weaknesses of their tools.

Passing the Ockham Sound Analysis Criteria requires that a static analysis tool detect “…a minimum of 60% of buggy sites OR of non-buggy sites.”, with no false-positives (which I take to mean that no incorrect warnings generated, i.e., the tool cannot incorrectly say “there is a fault here” or “there are no faults here”).

The obvious low cost tool implementation is to pattern detect the known problems in the known test suite (called the Juliet test suite) and output warnings about them. The only way for SAMATE to stop companies doing this (or at least tuning their tools to pass the suite) is to regularly change the test cases used.

I think I understand the rationale being the no false-positive requirement (SAMATE are using the marketing term “sound”). NIST want static analysis tools to be usable by people who don’t know anything about software; a strange idea I know, but the Nuclear Regulatory Commission have wanted to do this in the past.

Not being willing to accept false-positives kills innovation. New analysis techniques invariably start out being unreliable and improve over time.

I suspect that few vendors will have any interest in claiming to meet the Ockham Sound Analysis Criteria (apart from the ones that pattern match on the tests to satisfy some contract requirement). There is too much downside (new tests could put a vendor in the position of having to make a big investment just to continue to meet the criteria) for almost no upside (does anybody make purchase decisions based on this criteria?)

I think that the tool vendor (TrustinSoft) found they could make the claim and being relatively new in the tools market thought it might mean something to customers (I doubt it will, as their sales people are probably finding out). Of course what customers really want tool vendors to tell them is that their code does not contain any problems.

Hiring experts is cheaper in the long run

June 4th, 2013 No comments

The SAMATE (Software Assurance Metrics And Tool Evaluation) group at the US National Institute of Standards and Technology recently started hosting a new version of test suites for checking how good a job C/C++/Java static analysis tools do at detecting vulnerabilities in source code. The suites were contributed by the NSA‘s Center for Assured Software.

Other test suites hosted by SAMATE contain a handful of tests and have obviously been hand written, one for each kind of vulnerability. These kind of tests are useful for finding out whether a tool detects a given problem or not. In practice problems occur within a source code context (e.g., control flow path) and a tool’s ability to detect problems in a wide range of contexts is a crucial quality factor. The NSA’s report on the methodology used looked good and with the C/C++ suite containing 61,387 tests it was obviously worth investigating.

Summary: Not a developer friendly test suite that some tools will probably fail to process because it exceeds one of their internal limits. Contains lots of minor language infringements that could generate many unintended (and correct) warnings.

Recommendation: There are people in the US who know how to write C/C++ test suites, go hire some of them (since this is US government money there are probably rules that say it has to go to US companies).

I’m guessing that this test suite was written by people with a high security clearance and a better than average knowledge of C/C++. For this kind of work details matter and people with detailed knowledge are required.

Another recommendation: Pay compiler vendors to add checks to their compilers. The GCC people get virtually no funding to do front end work (nearly all funding comes from vendors wanting backend support). How much easier it would be for developers to check their code if they just had to toggle a compiler flag; installing another tool introduces huge compatibility and work flow issues.

I had this conversation with a guy from GCHQ last week (the UK equivalent of the NSA) who are in the process of spending £5 million over the next 3 years on funding research projects. I suspect a lot of this is because they want to attract bright young things to work for them (student sponsorship appears to be connected with the need to pass a vetting process), plus universities are always pointing out how more research can help (they are hardly likely to point out that research on many of the techniques used in practice was done donkey’s years ago).

Some details

Having over 379,000 lines in the main function is not a good idea. The functions used to test each vulnerability should be grouped into a hierarchy; main calling functions that implement say the top 20 categories of vulnerability, each of these functions containing calls to the next level down and so on. This approach makes it easy for the developer to switch in/out subsets of the tests and also makes it more likely that the tool will not hit some internal limit on function size.

The following log string is good in theory but has a couple of practical problems:

printLine("Calling CWE114_Process_Control__w32_char_connect_socket_03_good();");

C89 (the stated version of the C Standard being targeted) only requires identifiers to be significant to 32 characters, so differences in the 63rd character might be a problem. From the readability point of view it is a pain to have to check for values embedded that far into a string.

Again the overheads associated with storing so many strings of that length might cause problems for some tools, even good ones that might be doing string content scanning and checking.

The following is a recurring pattern of usage and has undefined behavior that is independent of the vulnerability being checked for. The lifetime of the variable shortBuffer terminates at the curly brace, }, and who knows what might happen if its address is accessed thereafter.

    data = NULL;
        /* FLAW: Point data to a short */
        short shortBuffer = 8;
        data = &shortBuffer;
    CWE843_Type_Confusion__short_68_badData = data;

A high quality tool would report the above problem, which occurs in several tests classified as GOOD, and so appear to be failing (i.e., generating a warning when none should be generated).

The tests contain a wide variety of minor nits like this that the higher quality tools are likely to flag.