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Posts Tagged ‘formal methods’

The first commercially available (claimed) verified compiler

October 31, 2018 2 comments

Yesterday, I read a paper containing a new claim by some of those involved with CompCert (yes, they of soap powder advertising fame): “CompCert is the first commercially available optimizing compiler that is formally verified, using machine assisted mathematical proofs, to be exempt from miscompilation”.

First commercially available; really? Surely there are earlier claims of verified compilers being commercial availability. Note, I’m saying claims; bits of the CompCert compiler have involved mathematical proofs (i.e., code generation), so I’m considering earlier claims having at least the level of intellectual honesty used in some CompCert papers (a very low bar).

What does commercially available mean? The CompCert system is open source (but is not free software), so I guess it’s commercially available via free downloading licensing from AbsInt (the paper does not define the term).

Computational Logic, Inc is the name that springs to mind, when thinking of commercial and formal verification. They were active from 1983 to 1997, and published some very interesting technical reports about their work (sadly there are gaps in the archive). One project was A Mechanically Verified Code Generator (in 1989) and their Gypsy system (a Pascal-like language+IDE) provided an environment for doing proofs of programs (I cannot find any reports online). Piton was a high-level assembler and there was a mechanically verified implementation (in 1988).

There is the Danish work on the formal specification of the code generators for their Ada compiler (while there was a formal specification of the Ada semantics in VDM, code generators tend to be much simpler beasts, i.e., a lot less work is needed in formal verification). The paper I have is: “Retargeting and rehosting the DDC Ada compiler system: A case study – the Honeywell DPS 6” by Clemmensen, from 1986 (cannot find an online copy). This Ada compiler was used by various hardware manufacturers, so it was definitely commercially available for (lots of) money.

Are then there any earlier verified compilers with a commercial connection? There is A PRACTICAL FORMAL SEMANTIC DEFINITION AND VERIFICATION SYSTEM FOR TYPED LISP, from 1976, which has “… has proved a number of interesting, non-trivial theorems including the total correctness of an algorithm which sorts by successive merging, the total correctness of the McCarthy-Painter compiler for expressions, …” (which sounds like a code generator, or part of one, to me).

Francis Morris’s thesis, from 1972, proves the correctness of compilers for three languages (each language contained a single feature) and discusses how these features may be combined into a more “realistic” language. No mention of commercial availability, but I cannot see the demand being that great.

The definition of PL/1 was written in VDM, a formal language. PL/1 is a huge language and there were lots of subsets. Were there any claims of formal verification of a subset compiler for PL/1? I have had little contact with the PL/1 world, so am not in a good position to know. Anybody?

Over to you dear reader. Are there any earlier claims of verified compilers and commercial availability?

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Does using formal methods mean anything?

August 29, 2016 1 comment

What counts as use of formal methods in software development?

Mathematics is involved, but then mathematics is involved in almost every aspect of software.

Formal methods are founded on the lie that doing things in mathematics means the results must be correct. There are plenty of mistakes in published mathematical proofs, as any practicing mathematician will tell you. The stuff that gets taught at school and university has been thoroughly checked and stood the test of time; the new stuff could be as bug written as software.

In the 1970s and 1980s formals methods was all about use of notation and formalisms. Writing algorithms, specifications, requirements, etc. in what looked like mathematical notation was called formal methods. The hope was that one day a tool would be available to check that what had been written did indeed have the characteristics being claimed, e.g., consistency, completeness, fault free (whatever that meant).

While everybody talked about automatic checking tools, what people spent their time doing was inventing new notations and formalisms. You were not a respected formal methods researcher unless you had several published papers, and preferably a book, describing your own formalism.

The market leader was VDM, mainly due to the work/promotion by Dansk Datamatik Center. I was a fan of Denotational semantics. There are even ISO standards for a couple of formal specification languages.

Fast forward to the last 10 years. What counts as done using formal methods today?

These days researchers who claim to be “doing formal methods” seem to be by writing code (which is an improvement over writing symbols on paper; it helps that today’s computers are orders of magnitude more powerful). The code written involves proof assistants such as Coq and Isabelle and programming languages such as OCaml and Haskell.

Can anybody writing code in OCaml or Haskell claim to be doing formal methods, or does a proof assistant of some kind have to be involved in the process?

If a program’s source code is translated into a form that can be handled by a proof assistant, can the issue of correctness of the translation be ignored? There is one research group who thinks it is ok to “trust” the translation process.

If one component of a program (say, parts of a compiler’s code generator) have been analyzed using a proof assistant, is it ok to claim that the entire program (perhaps the syntax and semantics processing that happens before code generation) has been formally verified? There is one research group who think such claims can be made about the entire program.

If I write a specification in Visual Basic, map this specification into C and involve formal methods at some point(s) in the process, then is it ok for me to claim that the correctness of the C implementation has been formally verified? There seem to be enough precedents for this claim to be viable.

In this day and age, is the use of formal methods anything more than a sign of intellectual dishonesty? Or is it just that today’s researchers are lazy, unwilling to put the effort into making sure that claims of correctness are proved start to finish?

Recent formal methods and C papers (Sep 2015)

September 14, 2015 2 comments

I have been catching up on my reading of papers from this year’s Programming Language Design and Implementation conference (whose organizers have not yet figured out that linking to pdfs of the papers might be useful).

Needless to say there are a few papers on formal methods and C:

  • “A Formal C Memory Model Supporting Integer-Pointer Casts” is a truly awful paper. It starts out: “The ISO C standard famously does not give semantics to a significant subset of syntactically valid C programs.” and goes down hill from there. As far as I know only one language, Algol 68, defines semantic requirements using syntax, all other languages specify a syntax which is a very large superset of the set of semantically valid programs. The paper goes on to define a C-like language that is also Java-like, C#-like and *-like most languages created in the last 20 years. I have no idea why this paper got accepted, is PLDI now a third tier conference?
  • Defining the undefinedness of C from the C-semantics guys. I could only find a version from 2012 online. Come on guys, you’re letting down one of your cheer-leaders. Update: pdf now available.
  • A Formal C Memory Model for Separation Logic (not at PLDI, but popped up on arXiv today). This is one of those annoying papers that could have been great, but shoots itself in the foot. The first 20 pages shows that the author is aware of some of the complications involved in modeling C’s behavior. This is followed by pages and pages of definitions, a scattering of lemmas and Facts; at page 51 The Theorems start, blah, blah, blah. Then we are almost done, there is a discussion of related work.

    Where is it shown that any of this stuff is connected to the requirements contained in the C Standard? The source of the implementation is provided, lets look at that; hmmm, no cross references to the C Standard here (in fact it is almost comment free). What about testing, processing source code to see what happens. The only mention of testing appears while discussing what the competition do (C-semantics; those pesky Americans again, not only not using Coq but testing their formal tools, don’t they know that anything written using mathematics must be correct).

    The author’s draft PhD thesis says something about testing; but I get the feeling that he only says something about it because the competition does, even mostly using their+others tests rather than coming up with lots of his own.

    While this work (part of the CH2O project) has clearly created a system that handles a chunk of real C, I don’t think it is anywhere close to being a very accurate model of C semantics. The author appears to be so much more interested in doing interesting mathematical stuff and finds it rather tiresome that the realities of C semantics disrupt the idealism.

Showing that they have clearly not learned how things are done in the formal semantics community, those pesky Americans have gone and produced a formal semantics for Javascript and tested it against the ECMAScript 5.1 conformance test suite (passing all 2,782 core language tests, Chrome V8 is the only other implementations that does this).

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Verified compilers and soap powder advertising

March 10, 2013 6 comments

There’s a new paper out claiming to be about a formally-verified C compiler, it even states a Theorem about its abilities! If this paper appeared as part of a Soap powder advert the Advertising Standards Authority would probably require clarification of the claims. What clarifications might appear in the small print tucked away at the bottom of the ad?

  1. C source code is not verified directly, it is first translated to the formal notations used by the verification system; the software that performs this translation is assumed to be correct.
  2. The CompCert system may successfully translate programs containing undefined behavior. Any proof statements made about such programs may not be valid.
  3. The support tools are assumed to be correct; primarily the Coq proof assistant, which is written in OCaml.
  4. The CompCert system makes decisions about implementation dependent behaviors and any proofs only apply in the context of these decisions.
  5. The CompCert system makes decisions about unspecified behaviors and any proofs only apply in the context of these decisions.

Some notes on the small print:

The C source translator used by CompCert rarely gets mentioned in any of the published papers; what was done to check its accuracy (I have previously discussed some options)? Presumably the developers who wrote it tried very hard to make sure they did a good job, just like the authors of f2c, a Fortran to C translator, did. Connecting f2c as a front-end of the CompCert system gives us a verified Fortran compiler! I think the f2c translator is much more likely to be correct than the CompCert C source translator, it has been used by a lot more people, processed a lot more source and maintained over a longer period.

When they encounter undefined behavior in source code production C compilers sometimes generate code that has very unexpected behavior. Using the CompCert system will not avoid unexpected behavior in these situations; CompCert simply washes its hands for this kind of code and says all bets are off.

Proving the support tools correct would simply move the assumption of correctness to a different set of tools. I am not aware of any major effort to test whether the Coq system behaves as intended, but have not read all the papers describing it (the list of reported faults is does not appear to be publicly available); bugs have been found in the OCaml implementation.

Like all compilers that generate code, CompCert has to make implementation dependent decisions and select one of the possible unspecified behaviors. The C-Semantics tool generates all unspecified behaviors, rather than just one.

Would you buy second hand software from a formal methods researcher?

May 23, 2012 No comments

I have been reading a paper on formally proving software correct (Bridging the Gap: Automatic Verified Abstraction of C by Greenaway, Andronick and Klein) and as often the case with papers on this topic the authors have failed to reach the level of honest presentation required by manufacturers of soap power in their adverts.

The Greenaway et al paper describes a process that uses a series of translation steps to convert a C program into what is claimed to be a high level specification in Isabelle/HOL (a language+support tool for doing formal proofs).

The paper was published by an Australian research group; I could not find an Australian advertising standards code dealing with soap power but did find one covering food and beverages. Here is what the Australian Association of National Advertisers has to say in their Food & Beverages Advertising & Marketing Communications Code:

“2.1 Advertising or Marketing Communications for Food or Beverage Products shall be truthful and honest, shall not be or be designed to be misleading or deceptive or otherwise contravene Prevailing Community Standards, and shall be communicated in a manner appropriate to the level of understanding of the target audience of the Advertising or Marketing Communication with an accurate presentation of all information…”

So what claims and statements do Greenaway et al make?

2.1 “Before code can be reasoned about, it must first be translated into the theorem prover.” A succinct introduction to one of the two main tasks, the other being to prove the correctness of these translations.

“In this work, we consider programs in C99 translated into Isabelle/HOL using Norrish’s C parser … As the parser must be trusted, it attempts to be simple, giving the most literal translation of C wherever possible.”

“As the parser must be trusted”? Why must it be trusted? Oh, because there is no proof that it is correct, in fact there is not a lot of supporting evidence that the language handled by Norrish’s translator is an faithful subset of C (ok, for his PhD Norrish wrote a formal semantics of a subset of C; but this is really just a compiler written in mathematics and there are umpteen PhDs who have written compilers for a subset of C; doing it using a mathematical notation does not make it any more fault free).

The rest of the paper describes how the output of Norrish’s translator is generally massaged to make it easier for people to read (e.g., remove redundant statements and rename variables).

Then we get to the conclusion which starts by claiming: “We have presented a tool that automatically abstracts low-level C semantics into higher-level specifications with automatic proofs of correctness for each of the transformation steps.”

Oh no you didn’t. There is no proof for the main transformation step of C to Isabelle/HOL. The only proofs described in the paper are for the post processing fiddling about that was done after the only major transformation step.

And what exactly is this “high-level specification”? The output of the Norrish translator was postprocessed to remove the clutter that invariably gets generated in any high-level language to high-level language translator. Is the result of this postprocessing a specification? Surely it is just a less cluttered representation of the original C?

Actually this paper does contain a major advance in formally proving software correct, tucked away at the start it says “As the parser must be trusted…”. There it is in black and white, if you have some software that must be trusted don’t bother with formal proofs just simply follow the advice given here.

But wait a minute you say, I am ignoring the get out of jail wording “… shall be communicated in a manner appropriate to the level of understanding of the target audience …”. What is the appropriate level of understanding of the target audience, in fact who is the target audience? Is the target audience other formal methods researchers who are familiar with the level of intellectual honesty within their field and take claims made by professional colleagues with a pinch of salt? Are non-formal methods researchers not the target audience and so have no redress to being misled by the any claims made by papers in this field?

Estimating the quality of a compiler implemented in mathematics

May 2, 2011 No comments

How can you tell if a language implementation done using mathematical methods lives up to the claims being made about it, without doing lots of work? Answers to the following questions should give you a good idea of the quality of the implementation, from a language specification perspective, at least for C.

  • How long did it take you to write it? I have yet to see any full implementation of a major language done in less than a man year; just understanding and handling the semantics, plus writing the test cases will take this long. I would expect an answer of at least several man years
  • Which professional validation suites have you tested the implementation against? Many man years of work have gone into the Perennial and PlumHall C validation suites and correctly processing either of them is a non-trivial task. The gcc test suite is too light-weight to count. The C Model Implementation passed both
  • How many faults have you found in the C Standard that have been accepted by WG14 (DRs for C90 and C99)? Everybody I know who has created a full implementation of a C front end based on the text of the C Standard has found faults in the existing wording. Creating a high quality formal definition requires great attention to detail and it is to be expected that some ambiguities/inconsistencies will be found in the Standard. C Model Implementation project discoveries include these and these.
  • How many ‘rules’ does the implementation contain? For the C Model Implementation (originally written in Pascal and then translated to C) every if-statement it contained was cross referenced to either a requirement in the C90 standard or to an internal documentation reference; there were 1,327 references to the Environment and Language clauses (200 of which were in the preprocessor and 187 involved syntax). My C99 book lists 2,043 sentences in the equivalent clauses, consistent with a 70% increase in page count over C90. The page count for C1X is around 10% greater than C99. So for a formal definition of C99 or C1X we are looking for at around 2,000 language specific ‘rules’ plus others associated with internal housekeeping functions.
  • What percentage of the implementation is executed by test cases? How do you know code/mathematics works if it has not been tested? The front end of the C Model Implementation contains 6,900 basic blocks of which 87 are not executed by any test case (98.7% coverage); most of the unexecuted basic blocks require unusual error conditions to occur, e.g., disc full, and we eventually gave up trying to figure out whether a small number of them were dead code or just needed the right form of input (these days genetic programming could be used to help out and also to improve the quality of coverage to something like say MC/DC, but developing on a PC with a 16M hard disc does limit what can be done {the later arrival of a Sun 4 with 32M of RAM was mind blowing}).

Other suggested questions or numbers applicable to other languages most welcome. Some forms of language definition do not include a written specification, which makes any measurement of implementation conformance problematic.

Proving software correct

Users want confidence that software is ‘correct’; what constitutes correct depends on who you talk to and can vary between doing what the user expects and behaving according to a specification (which may include behavior that users did not expect or want).

The gold standard for software correctness is that achieved by mathematical proofs, or at least what most people believe is achieved by such proofs, i.e., a statement that is shown through a sequence of steps to be derived from a set of axioms. The sequence of steps used in most real proofs operate at a much higher level than axioms and rely on the reader to fill in the gaps left between each step. Ever since theorems were first stated they sometimes contained faults, i.e., were not correct theorems, and as mathematicians have continued to increase the size and complexity of theorems being ‘proved’ the technical and social issues involved in believing a published proof have grown in complexity.

Software proofs usually operate by translating the source in to some mathematical formalism and using a theorem prover to show that one or more properties are met. Perhaps the most famous use of such a proof that had an outcome different than that predicted is the 1996 Ariane 5 rocket crash; various proofs had been obtained for the Ariane 4 software showing that the value of some variables would never exceed given limits, these proofs involved input values that depended on the performance of the rocket and because Ariane 5 was more powerful than Ariane 4 the proofs were no longer valid (management would have found this out had they recheck the proofs using the larger values). Update: My only knowledge of this work comes from a conversation I recall with somebody working in the formal verification area, I no longer have contact with them and the company they worked for no longer exists; Pascal Cuoq’s comment below suggests they may have overstated the formal nature of the work, I have no means of double checking.

Purveyors of ‘software proof’ systems will tell you about the importance of feeding in the correct input values and will tell you about the known proofs they have managed to verify using their system. The elephant in the room that rarely gets mentioned is the correctness of the program that translates source code into the mathematical formalism used. These translators often handle that subset of the language which is relatively easy to map to the target formalism, the MALPAS C to IL translator is one exception to this (ok, yes my company wrote this translator so the opinion might be a little biased).

The method commonly associated with claims of correctness proof for a translator or compiler is slightly different from that described above for applications. This method involves manually writing some mathematics, using the chosen formalism, that ‘implements’ the translator/compiler. Strangely there are people who think that doing this is sufficient to claim the compiler is ‘verified’ or ‘proved correct’. As any schoolboy knows it is possible to write mathematics that contains mistakes and the writing of a mathematical implementation is just the first step in a process intended to increase confidence in a claim of correctness.

One of the questions that might be asked of a ‘mathematics implementation’ of a compiler is: does it faithfully interpret source code syntax/semantics according to the syntax/semantics specified in the appropriate language document?

Answering this question requires that the language syntax/semantics be specified in some mathematical notation that is amenable to formal analysis. Various researchers have created mathematical models for languages such as Ada, CHILL and C. However, these models are not recognized as being definitive, that status belongs to the corresponding ISO Standard written in English prose. The Modula-2 standard is specified using both English prose and equivalent mathematical notation with both having equal status as the definition of the language (any inconsistency between the two is decided why analyzing what behavior was intended); there were lots of plans to do stuff with this mathematics but the ISO language committee struggled just to produce a tool capable of printing the mathematics.

The developers of the Compcert system refer to it as a formally verified C compiler front-end when the language actually verified is called Clight, which they describe as a subset of the C language. This is very interesting work and I hope they continue to refine it and add support for more C-like constructs. But let’s be clear, the one thing missing from this project is any proof of a connection to the requirements contained in the C Standard.

I don’t know what it is about formal verification but those involved can at the same time be both very particular about the language they use in their mathematics and completely over the top in the claims they make about what their tools do. A speaker from Polyspace at one MISRA C conference claimed his tool could detect 100% of the coding guidelines specified in MISRA C, a surprising achievement for a runtime tool (as it was then) enforcing requirements mainly aimed at source code; I eventually got him to agree that the tool detected 100% of the constructs specified by the small subset of guidelines they had implemented.

I doubt that the Advertising Standard Authority would allow adverts containing the claims made by some formal verification advocates to appear in print or on TV; if soap manufacturers have to follow ASA rules then so should formal verification researchers.

Without a language specification written in a form amenable to mathematical analysis any claims of correctness have to be based on the traditional means of reading English prose very carefully and writing lots of tests to probe every obscure corner of the language specification. This was the approach used for the production of the Model Implementation of C, a system designed to detect all unspecified, implementation defined and undefined uses in C programs (it used a compiler, linker and interpreter). One measure of how well an implementor has studied the standard is how many faults they have discovered in it (some people claim this is a quality of standard issue, but the similar number of defects reported against the Ada and C Standards show that at least for Ada this is not true); here are some from the Model Implementation project.

Performance on independently written tests can be a good indicator of implementation correctness, depending on the quality of the tests. Both the Perennial and PlumHall C validation suites are of high quality, while suites such as the gcc testsuite are rather ad-hoc, have poor coverage and tend to be runtime oriented. The problem with high quality validation suites is that they cost enough money to put them out of reach of many research groups (I suspect another problem is that such groups don’t understand the benefits of using such suites or think they can do just as good a job in a few weeks).

Recently a new formal verification tool for C has appeared that performs all its verification checking at program runtime, i.e., after the user source has been translated to executable form. It is still very early days for kcc (they have yet to chose a name and the command used to invoke the translator is currently being used), they have an initial system up and running and are keen to continue improving it.

I am interested in the system because of what it might evolve into, including:

  • a means of quickly checking the behavior of obscure bits of code (I get asked all sorts of weird questions and my brain is not always willing to switch to C language lawyer mode),
  • a means of checking the consistency of the requirements in the C Standard, which will require another tool making use of the formalism built up by kcc,
  • a tool which would help developers understand which parts of the C Standard they need to look at to understand some construct (the tool currently has a trace mode that needs lots of work).

Why is code so fault tolerant?

December 22, 2008 No comments

All professional developers eventually encounter a program containing a fault that appears to be so devastating that the program could not possibly perform its intended task, yet the program has been and continues to function more or less as expected.  In my case the program was a cpu instruction set emulator (for a Z80 written in Fortran) that I had written and the fault was a copy-and-past editing mistake that resulted in one of the subtract instructions behaving like the equivalent addition instruction.  The emulator was used to  execute CP/M and various applications (on a minicomputer that did not have any desktop office applications).  I was astounded that CP/M booted and appeared to work correctly, along with various applications (apart from the one exhibiting behavior differences that resulted in me tracking down this fault).

My own continuing experience with apparently fatal faults, in mine and other peoples code, lead me to the conclusion that researchers should be putting most of their effort into trying to figure out why so much software does such a good job of behaving in an acceptable manner while containing so many faults (of various apparent seriousness).  Proving software correctness is an expensive and time consuming dead-end for all but a few specialist applications.

One way for developers to vividly see how robust most software is to random faults is to use a mutation tool on the source.  Such tools introduce faults into code with the aim of checking the thoroughness of a set of test cases.  It is a sobering experience to see how many mutations fail to have any noticeable effect on a programs external behavior.

One group of researchers took this mutation idea to an extreme by changing all less-than operators in for-loops into less-than-or-equals operators. They found that only a handful of the changes prevented the recompiled programs being at all useful to users. While some of the changes produced output that was obviously incorrect, it was still possible to use much of the original functionality.

What is it about the shape of most code that allows it to continue to function in the presence of faults? It is time faults were acknowledged as a fact of life in all actively developed systems and that we should concentrate on developing techniques to help ensure that software containing them continues to behave as intended, rather than the unsophisticated zero-tolerance approach that has held sway for so long.